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IN THE SUPRExME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
EGBERT-HADERLIE HOG FARMS, INC., 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Supreme Court No. 14223 
oooOooo 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this action defendant-appellant, Egbert-Haderlie 
Hog Farms, Inc., seeks to recover for livestock and property 
damage from plaintiff-respondent, Utah Cooperative Association, 
on the theory that plaintiff-respondent breached an express 
warranty of conformity and an implied warranty of merchantability 
under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury on the theory of breach 
of express and implied warranties and the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff-respondent and 
against defendant-appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the directed 
verdict entered against it and a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant-appellant (hereinafter defendant) is 
a close corporation which operated a hog farm near Spanish 
Fork, Utah during 197 3. The managing shareholders of that 
corporation were Howard B. Egbert and Paul Haderlie. The 
plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter plaintiff) is a farmerfs 
cooperative which both sells and processes livestock feed. 
Defendant's hogs were purbread Durocs which were 
kept in a pathogen free environment, (Tr* 192) and were more 
susceptible to disease than ordinary hogs (Tr* 194). During 
1973, defendant fed his hogs according to a dietary formula 
developed by Standard Chemical of Omaha, Nebraska (Tr. 15-16). 
That formula called for the mixture of one of Standard ChemicalTs 
products, Mr. Meaty Base Mix, together with corn, barley, wheat, 
soybean meal and some organic chemicals (Exhibit 60-P). On 
June 25, 1973, Mr. Haderlie arrived at plaintiff's Orem feed 
mill with one hundred pounds of Mr. Meaty Base Mix which he had 
purchased from Dalin Reese (Tr. 21). There Mr. Haderlie con-
sulted with plaintiff concerning the cost of the additional 
raw ingredients in the formula and instructed plaintiff to 
write up a mixing order containing the exact formula he wanted 
(Tr* 21). Mr. Haderlie further instructed plaintiff to mix 
defendant's meat base mix with plaintiff's raw ingredients and 
pelletize that mixture into a finished hog feed (Tr. 21). 
Mr. Haderlie thought the pelletizing process was of significant 
value to defendant's operation (Tr. 18). In all, there were 
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found no trace of salmonella in the six feed samples it 
tested (Exhibits 83-D and 88-P); Intermountain Laboratories 
discovered only moderate salmonella in one of the three feed 
samples it tested (Exhibit 61-D); and, Mr. Haderlie testified 
that he received a report from Omaha Testing Laboratories that 
one of three feed samples had tested positively for salmonella 
(Tr. 121). 
Defendant suffered livestock damage resulting from 
an outbreak of salmonella (Tr* 48) and filed this action* and 
at trial, limited its claim to damages resulting from breach 
of express and implied warranties under the UCC. 
ARGUMENT 
There are several grounds upon which the trial court's 
directed verdict can and should be sustained. It is axiomatic 
that this court affirm the judgment below if the record on 
appeal will allow. Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Associa-
tion, 23 IK 2d 222, 461 P. 2d 290 (1969). Even if grounds not 
submitted on appeal constitute a basis for upholding the trial 
court's judgment,"this court is obliged to affirm the judgment* 
Peterson v. Fowler, 29 U.2d 366, 510 P.2d 523 (1973). 
The defendant's burden on appeal is to convince this 
court that the trial court committed reversible error in direct-
ing a verdict for the plaintiff. That burden is not met if 
there is any ground upon which this court can sustain the lower 
court's directed verdict. Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522, 229 P.2d 
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874 (1951); Reid v. Anderson, 116 Utah 455 , 211 P.2d 206 
(1949). Because the resolution of that question is primarily 
evidentiary, care has been taken to quote directly from the 
trial transcript concerning each of defendant's failures of 
proof. And, although those failures grow with cumulative 
weight, each failure alone is justification for the lower 
court's refusal to submit the case to the jury. 
Plaintiff submits that defendant's lack of evidence 
on material issues supports the trial court's decision. There 
was a fatal lack of evidence on the following issues: 
a. Evidence that the transaction was a sale 
of goods governed by the UCC to which 
warranties attached; 
b. Evidence that there existed an express 
warranty, that such warranty was breached, 
and that the defendant sustained damage as 
a result of that breach; 
c. Evidence that the goods sold to the defen-
dant by the plaintiff were in some way 
contaminated with salmonella; and 
d. Evidence that salmonella, even if it were 
assumed to exist in plaintiff's goods, 
was a breach of an implied warranty of 
merchantability. 
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The defendant recognizes its failure of proof and 
has suggested on appeal that this court rely heavily on cir-
cumstantial evidence in the record and extract therefrom 
inference upon inference in order to find some evidence which 
would have supported a jury verdict. 
The defendant tried this case solely on the theory 
of warranty und€>r the Uniform Commercial Code, 70A Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 2-313, 2-314. Although defendant may have used 
another legal theory or presented additional evidence, the 
record demonstrates that defendant's case in chief failed to 
present evidence from which a jury reasonably could have found 
liability on defendant's theory of the case. Under such cir-
cumstances, the court below was not only justified, but required 
to direct a verdict* 
To support its appeal, defendant relies on an express 
warranty of conformity and an implied warranty of merchant-
ability. Plaintiff addresses the express warranty in Point I 
and the implied warranty of merchantability in Point II. Although 
defendant does not suggest on appeal the existence of an implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, plaintiff, in 
Point III, briefly discusses that implied warranty to contrast 
it to the warranty of merchantability. 
POINT I 
NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF BREACHED AN EXPRESS WARRANTY UNDER THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE WHICH CAUSED INJURY TO DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendant's only claim of the creation of an express 
warranty is that the written mixing order of June 25, 1973, 
(Exhibit 60-P) which contained mixing and pelletizing instruc-
tions, created an express warranty (Appellant's Brief pp 13, 16) 
by virtue of §70-2-313(1) (b) of the Utah Code which provides: 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created 
as follows: 
(b) Any description of the goods which is 
made part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the 
goods shall conform to the affirmation 
or promise. 
Warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code, Title 70A of Utah 
Code Annotated, then, arise only between sellers and buyers 
relating to the sale of goods. "Sale" is defined in the Uniform 
Commercial Code as the ". . . passing of title from the seller 
to the buyer for a price." U.C.A. § 70A-2-106. 
The written mixing order of June 25, 1973 (Exhibit 60-P) 
contemplated a transaction in which plaintiff contracted to 
perform the service of mixing and pelletizing the components 
listed. In conjunction with this transaction, plaintiff sold 
some grains to defendant and defendant supplied a component 
to plaintiff to be mixed and pelletized with the components 
sold by plaintiff. 
A warranty may extend only to so much of the trans-
action as relates to the sale of goods and does not apply to 
transactions which are predominantly for services rather than 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a sale of goods. St. Lukes Hospital v. Schmaltz, 5 34 P. 2d 
781 (Colo. 1975). To make the determination of the character 
of the transaction, as defendant notes in its brief, courts 
will look to the evidence in the record to ascertain whether 
the primary objective of the transaction was the performance 
of a service or the sale of goods. If the primary objective 
is the sale of goods, the implied warranties under the UCC 
and that contained in § 70A-2-313(l)(b) of the Utah Code are 
applicable. If the primary objective is the rendering of 
services, however, such warranties are inapplicable. In the 
instant case the record reveals no evidence that the trans-
action in question was primarily for the sale of goods, but 
indicates instead that the transaction was primarily for the 
rendering of services* The only evidence in the record tends 
to show the defendant's main objective was obtaining the 
service of mixing and pelletizing. The mixing order itself 
reflects instructions to mix and pelletize certain grains with 
a meat mix which was supplied by the defendant itself (Exhibit 
60-P). Mr. Haderlie repeatedly referred to the agreement 
between the parties as a "mixing order" (Tr. 21, 22). Mr. Haderlie 
further testified that the pelletizing was of singular impor-
tance to him (Tr. 17, 77). The only evidence in the record 
tends to establish that the transaction in question was 
primarily for the rendering of services and there is no evidence 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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from which the jury could reasonably have drawn the conclusion 
that this transaction was primarily for the sale of goods and, 
therefore, subject to the warranties imposed by the UCC and 
§ 70A-2-313(l) (b). 
Even if this failure of proof is overlooked and this 
court determines that the transaction is predominantly one for 
sale of goods elevating the mixing order to an express warranty 
contemplated by U.C.A. § 70A-2-313, the defendant failed to 
introduce evidence at trial to establish that the warranty had 
been breached and that such a breach was linked to the outbreak 
of salmonella which defendant alleges as the cause of its 
damages. 
If an express warranty were created by the written 
mixing order, it related only to the component parts which 
would be contained in each ton of mixed livestock feed, i.e., 
it would contain soybean meal, corn, barley, salt, S.P. 250 
and organic iodine. There was no express warranty of any kind 
relating to the quality of the grains sold by plaintiff, only 
the implied warranty of merchantability which arises when 
merchants sell goods. No warranties, either express or implied, 
could have been given by plaintiff to defendant concerning the 
Mr. Meaty Base Mix since that portion of the livestock feed 
was furnished to plaintiff. § 70A-2-106. To hold that any warranty 
extended to the Mr. Meaty Base Mix would be to make the plaintiff 
an insuror of the quality of goods which were supplied to it 
by the defendant itself. In such circumstances the risk bearer 
or insurer should locricallv h^ +-Ho A~*—J— •-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The only evidence that the livestock feed did not 
conform to the written mixing order, at the time it left the 
control of the plaintiff and was delivered to defendant, was 
the testimony of Mr. Haderlie that the feed was off color and 
had a different smell which led him to believe that "screen-
ings" had been blended into the feed (Tr. 40, 43). While 
this testimony may have created a question as to whether the 
delivered livestock feed contained "screenings" in addition to 
the ingredients listed on the mixing order, defendant intro-
duced not one iota of evidence in its case in chief which 
would in any way link salmonella with these "grain screenings". 
Likewise no evidence was introduced which linked salmonella 
with the listed ingredients sold by plaintiff. There was no 
evidence upon which a jury could find a casual connection between 
plaintiff's alleged breach and the salmonella contamination * 
Even if this court were to assume that the alleged addition 
of "screenings" raises a factual issue whether such screen-
ings caused the contamination, such an assumption can be based 
only on Haderlie1s own testimony regarding the color and smell 
of the feed at the time of delivery (Tr. 40, 43). The court 
would also necessarily have to conclude that as a matter of law, 
Haderlie voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known and 
appreciated danger. Such knowledge, as defendant concedes 
(Appellant's Brief pp 12-13), is an absolute defense in a breach 
of warranty case. Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 
P.2d 302 (1971). 
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Defendant, in its brief, cites Vernon v. Lake Motors, 
26 U.2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971), as authority for the proposi-
tion that defendant had no evidentiary obligation to isolate 
the specific ingredient which was the source of the contamination 
(Appellant's Brief pp 23-24). In Vernon, plaintiffs purchased 
an automobile from defendants which was damaged when a fire 
occurred under the dashboard and plaintiffs brought suit alleg-
ing breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code* In 
a case like Vernon, in which all the component parts of the 
finished product had been sold and warranted by the seller, it 
would be unduly burdensome to cause the buyer to pinpoint the 
source of the difficulty. However, in a transaction like the 
one involved in the instant case, where a significant component 
of the final product is supplied by the buyer himself, then the 
buyer has a duty to come forward with some evidence demonstrat-
ing that the cause of the injury was in the component sold and 
warranted by the party against whom the claim is asserted. 
Plaintiff submits that the court's decision in Vernon would have 
been different had the evidence shown that the Vernons had 
ordered a new Ford automobile from Lake Motors but had brought 
in their own set of resistors which they had bought from a 
third party and requested that these resistors be placed in 
the car's electrical circuitry in place of the Ford manufactured 
resistors. In such a situation, it is elementary that the buyer 
would have the burden of adducing some evidence that the mal-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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functioning part which caused the damage was a part which had 
been sold by the seller and not one which the buyer had himself 
supplied. 
Defendants contention that the trial court's directed 
verdict was erroneous under the theory of express warranty is 
without merit.. First, no evidence was adduced to show that 
the written mixing order related to a transaction which was 
predominately one for the sale of goods rather than for the 
rendition of services. Thus, there was no evidence that the 
transaction was even subject to Uniform Commercial Code warranties. 
Second, even if the livestock feed was the subject of an express 
warranty under the UCC that it would conform to the mixing order, 
there was no evidence even suggesting a casual connection between 
alleged non-conformity in the composition of the mixed feed 
and defendant's alleged damage attributable to salmonella. Third, 
if this court were to assume a casual connection between the 
alleged non-conformity and salmonella contamination, it would 
have to do so on the basis of defendant's own testimony which 
would, in turn, necessarily establish, as a matter of law, a 
knowing and voluntary assumption of risk. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE DEFENDANT'S 
ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PLAINTIFF BREACHED AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF 
MERCHANTABILITY. 
The warranty of merchantability, unless otherwise 
excluded, is implied in certain contracts for the sale of goods 
in Utah by § 70A-2-314(1). 
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This warranty is implied where: 
(a) There is a contract of sale of goods; and 
(b) The seller is a merchant with respect to 
goods of the kind sought to be warranted. 
Consequently, if goods are not "sold", as that term is defined 
by § 70A-2-106, Utah Code, or the seller of the goods is not 
a merchant dealing in that kind of goods, no vrarranty of mer-
chantability is implied. At trial, the defendant presented no 
evidence upon which the jury could have reasonably determined 
that the plaintiff breached this warranty with respect to any 
goods sold the defendant. 
A. DEFENDANT INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF SALMONELLA IN PLAINTIFF'S GOODS 
1. Defendant failed to adduce evidence of 
contamination in plaintiff's goods. 
The defendant failed to adduce any evidence upon 
which the jury could have relied to find that salmonella 
existed in plaintiff's grains at the time the feed was delivered 
to the defendant. The defendant seeks to excuse this failing 
by attempting to burden the plaintiff with the responsibility 
of vouchsafing the quality of the component supplied by defen-
dant itself, the Mr. Meaty Mix. Such a burden is not only 
unsupported by the law but strains reason to its limits. 
To avoid the failure of its evidence, the defendant 
first argues that the arrangements between plaintiff and 
defendant constituted a sale of only the finished product, a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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processed hog feed, and that the transaction cannot be broken 
down into separate transactions. This argument ignores the 
undisputed facts in the record. Mr. Haderlie clearly testified 
of the separateness of the transactions and his interest in the 
cost of plaintiff's grain. 
Q. (Mr.. Van Wagoner) Now let me be sure I 
understand it. You bought the Mr. Meaty Mix from 
someone named Dalin Reese; is that correct? 
A. (Mr. Haderlie) Yes. 
Q. And you then took the Mr. Meaty Mix 
yourself to UCA when it was to be mixed; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q* And you purchased the grain that went 
into the mix from UCA; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then UCA took the Mr. Meaty that 
you had purchased and combined it with the grain 
that you purchased from them and mixed for you into 
pellets? 
A- Yes. (Tr. 76) 
Q. Did you enter into a contract then with 
them for a certain amount of grain to be delivered 
at certain points in time? 
A. To this extent, that we consulted with 
them as to costs of raw ingredients and discussed 
formulas with them. And then we would write up 
a — they would write up a formula on this produc-
tion order for us. (emphasis added) 
Q. Now, the raw ingredients are a specific 
cost; is that right? There is a certain cost for 
the grain? 
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A* Yes. 
Q. And then there is a certain cost for 
having it mixed up together with your Mr. Meaty? 
A* Yes. 
Q. So really you are paying three different 
prices. You are paying for the Mr. Meaty. You 
are paying for the grain and you are paying for 
having it mixed together; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. 77 ) 
The record lacks evidence to show that the contract 
between plaintiff and defendant contemplated only the sale of 
a processed hog feed. Mr. Haderliefs testimony is unequivocal: 
He bought grains from the plaintiff and then paid the plaintiff 
to mix its grains with his own Mr. Meaty Mix. Mr. Haderlie 
would not have questioned the plaintiff regarding the cost 
of raw ingredients if the defendant was contracting to buy 
only a finished product. Additionally, plaintiff's invoices 
(Exhibit 60-P) also reflect the breakdown of ingredients men-
tioned by Mr. Haderlie. Finally, even in answer to his 
counsel's own questions, Mr. Haderlie recognized the component 
nature of the transaction. 
Q. Now the rest of the components, the 
soybean, the grain, the corn, the barley, who 
supplied that? (emphasis added) 
A. Gro-Best. 
Q. The Mr. Meaty Mix, where did you purchase 
this from? 
A. We purchased it from Dalin Reese. (Tr. 21) 
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The defendant has sought to avoid its burden of proof by argu-
ing that the plaintiff should warrant what it did not own, 
control, or sell* The law implies this warranty of merchant-
ability only when goods are sold. Section 70A-2-106 of the 
Utah Code states that goods are sold when title passes for a 
price. Here there is no evidence that the plaintiff at any 
time held title to the Mr. Meaty Mix or passed title to the 
defendant for a price. To adopt the defendant's statement of 
the law would be to disregard the explicit language of the 
Code and place a seller in the position of providing a supplier 
with a warranty for products about which he has no knowledge, 
over which he exercises no control, and from which he receives 
no remuneration. It is unreasonable to charge a seller with 
such a burden; that burden must be borne by the supplying buyer. 
And, if the resulting mixture of the products of the buyer 
and seller is in someway defective, such a supplying buyer 
must bear the burden of separating out that which the buyer 
caused to be combined. Any other resolution would place 
sellers, acting in good faith to accommodate customersf at 
the mercy of unprincipled, careless, or designing buyers who 
choose to supply certain components of a finished product. A 
seller does not warrant that which he does not sell. 
The defendant further attempts to justify its failure 
of evidence by arguing that even if it supplied a component of 
the feed, the whole transaction should be characterized by its 
predominant feature which defendant argues is the purchase of 
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a processed hog feed. In effect, defendant argues that plaintiff 
is the seller of defendant's own goods. To support this unpre-
cedented argument, the defendant relies on cases which concern 
the distinction between services and sales. Certainly there 
is precedent and reason to support courts' conclusions that 
some transactions involving both the rendition of services and 
the use of goods in connection with those services are in 
essence a sale of goods and therefore those goods are subject 
to UCC warranties. But no court has been willing to charge a 
seller with warranty responsibility for goods he did not sell 
regardless of the nature of the transaction. The rationale of 
each of defendant's cited cases would be markedly altered if 
any of the buyers had also supplied a component of the goods 
purchased. In the beauty salon cases, the nature of the proof 
presented would differ if the buyers had supplied their own 
shampoo and then developed a rash or lost hair. In such a case, 
the plaintiff would first need to establish that the transaction 
was one predominantly for the sale of goods, and then come 
forward with some evidence to show that the salon's rinse, hair 
coloring, or similar product created the problem. Obviously 
such a plaintiff could not avoid her burden of proof by recit-
ing that she was really only interested in the final result, a 
permanent wave. The same problem would face a patient who 
required three pints of blood and supplied one pint of his own 
from a third source. In such cases, even if it were established 
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that the transaction was primarily one for the sale of goods, 
the plaintiff would be required to produce evidence upon 
which a jury could conclude that the contamination was in 
one of the two pints sold by the hospital. 
The trial court's directed verdict can be sustained 
on either of two additional grounds: 
(a) That there is no evidence in the record 
upon which a jury could reasonably have 
found that the transaction involved was 
for the sale of goods, and consequently 
no warranty of merchantability was implied 
by law; or 
(b) Even if the transaction were predominantly 
a sale of goods, there is no evidence in 
he record from which the jury could reason-
ably have found that there was any salmonella 
in plaintiff's sold and warranted goodsf 
hence the jury could only have speculated 
in determining plaintiff1s liability« 
2. Defendant failed to adduce sufficient competent 
circumstantial evidence of contamination in plaintiff's goods. 
The defendant recognizes its failure of evidence and 
seeks to characterize conjecture as circumstantial evidence from 
which the jury might have drawn the defendant's desired infer-
ences. To sustain its position that its evidence is sufficient 
to go to the jury the defendant cites the "more probable than 
not" rule of circumstantial evidence as advanced by Vernon v. 
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Lake Motors, 26 U.2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971). That rule of 
evidence allows a question to be submitted to a jury based on 
circumstance alone if there is a rational basis for concluding 
it was more probable than not that the plaintiffs goods were 
the source of the defendant's injury. Conger v. Pant & Russell/ 
Inc., 443 P.2d 201 (Or. 1968); Kaufman v. Fisher, 230 Or. 626, 
371 P.2d 948 (1962). However, if the evidence does not rise to 
that probative quality it cannot go to the jury for the court 
may not permit the jury to speculate upon the evidence, and a 
finding of fact cannot be based upon surmise, conjecture, guess, 
or speculation. 01sen v. Warwood, 123 Utah 111, 255 P.2d 775 
(Utah 1953); Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P.2d 566 
(Utah 1947). 
Defendant presented no evidence of contamination in 
plaintiff's goods at the time of delivery and the modicum of 
circumstantial evidence in the record does not meet the test 
of competency. Defendant's own experts testified that it was 
significantly more likely that any salmonella in the processed 
feed would have come from defendant's meat base mix and not 
from plaintifffs grain. 
Dr. Derrick testified as follows: 
Q. (Mr. Van Wagoner) And would you say, based 
on your understanding of the salmonella organism 
and where it appears, that it is more likely that 
salmonella would be found in a meat substance than 
in a grain substance? 
A. (Dr. Paul Derrick) Yes. I would imagine 
that usually it — probably the origin in a case 
like that would have been from a meat rather than 
the grain. 
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Q. Isn't it rather rare to find it in wheat 
or other kinds of grains? 
A. Yes. It would probably have to have 
some sort of contamination like fecal contamination 
or meat added to it that had the organism. (Tr. 144) 
Dr. Hunter concurred with Dr. Derrick: 
Q. (Mr. Van Wagoner) You mean its not likely — 
you are not more likely to find salmonella in meat 
bases such as, oh, a fish or meat base than you are 
in a grain? 
A. (Dr. John Hunter) Oh, yes. 
Q. Significantly more probable, aren't you? 
A. Yes. (Tr. 182-183) 
This case differs markedly from Vernon v. Lake Motors, 
supra. In that case, there was no question that the defective 
wiring was warranted. The entire car was sold by the Ford 
dealer, title to the wiring passed from Lake Motors to the 
Vernons, and the Vernons supplied no constituent part of the 
automobile. When the Vernon's dashboard flared, it was reason-
able for a jury to have concluded from those circumstances that 
the fire more likely than not originated in something sold with 
the car. There appears to have been no evidence that there 
could have been any other source. Although the exact source of 
the fire eluded positive proof, the Vernons could, and did, 
show that it originated under the dashboard, that there had 
been previous difficulty with the car, including the windshield 
wipers, and that the car had not been serviced by anyone else. 
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The case at bar, is much different. Here it is as if the 
Vernons had taken their car to a local Coalville mechanic who, 
at their insistance, replaced a portion of the wiring, prior 
to the fire. In such a case, the Vernons would have an 
obligation to present competent evidence to show it more likely 
than not that something warranted by Ford was the cause of the 
damage. Under such circumstances a mechanic's opinion that the 
fire started in the wiring could add nothing. The jury would still 
lack evidence of causation. The plaintiff in the instant case 
does not demand that this defendant specify v/hether the salmonella 
was found in the soybean meal, the corn, the barley, the salt, 
or the organic iodine, which were the component goods plaintiff 
sold. That would constitute an unnecessary burden. This Court, 
however, must require the defendant to adduce some evidence 
that plaintiff's goods, as a group, were contaminated with 
salmonella at the time of delivery. 
Although each of Defendant's experts alluded to the 
need for fecal contamination to introduce salmonella in grain, 
the defendant presented no evidence to show that there was or 
could have been fecal contamination in the plaintiff's grain 
at the time of delivery. Additionally, even if this Court were 
to adopt the defendant's argument that the plaintiff sold only 
a finished hog feed, including the meat base which defendant 
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itself supplied, there is no competent evidence to show that the 
finished feed much less, plaintiff's grains, contained salmonella 
before it arrived at the defendant's farm. Defendant's only 
evidence is the admittedly unsupported speculation of defendant's 
veterinarian which came into the record as a result of the 
trial court's erroneous ruling of admissibility. It was abun-
dantly evident from Dr. Hunter's testimony that he had no foundation 
upon which to base a conclusion that the hog feed contained 
salmonella at the time of delivery. On cross examination Dr. 
Hunter was unable even to begin to tell at what time the salmonella 
was introduced into the feed. 
Q. (Mr. Van Wagoner) Can you tell from what 
you have seen from that report that came back from 
Intermountain LabiF can you tell when that fecal 
material got into that feed? 
A. (Dr. Hunter) No. 
Q. You can't tell if it got into the feed 
after the time it got to Mr. Haderlie's place? 
A. No. 
Q. . . . And you canft tell from that report 
whether it was contaminated in the grain or the meat 
base mix, can you? 
A. Of course not. 
Q. You can't even begin to tell at what time 
the fecal contamination occurred, can you? 
A. No. 
(Tr. 173-174) 
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On redirect defendant's counsel tried to elicit a different 
response regarding the same matter, for which there was now 
obviously no foundation. 
Q. (Mr. Phil Patterson) And do you have an 
opinion as to when that fecal contamination was 
introduced into the feed, in light of the testing, 
the evaluation and the other factors which you con-
sidered on the hog farm? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what is that opinion. 
At this point counsel for plaintiff objected because Dr. Hunter 
had previously suggested that he had not the slightest av/areness 
of the time at which there had been such fecal contamination. 
Mr. Van Wagoner: I object, Your Honor, 
on the grounds that the question was asked by me 
in cross-examination and the answer was that he 
did not know. 
Counsel for the defendant then suggested that plaintiff had 
mischaracterized Dr. Hunter's testimony, and on that basis the 
court admitted the evidence. 
Mr. Phillip Patterson: I don't believe that's 
correct, Your Honor. I will submit it without going 
back into the record. 
THE COURT: He may answer. 
Dr. Hunter: I think that it would have had to 
have entered sometime prior to the arrival on the 
Egbert-Haderlie Hog Farm. 
(Tr. 193-194) 
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It is clear from a reading of the record that at the time 
Dr. Hunter rendered this opinion he possessed no facts or data 
to support it. Plaintiff's counsel labored with Dr. Hunter on 
cross-examination to ascertain if there was some foundation 
for such an opinion. Then Dr. Hunter admitted that the report 
from Intermountain Lab was of no aid, and further agreed that 
he could not even "begin to tell" when salmonella entered the 
feed. Consequently, when Dr. Hunter began to testify "in light 
of the testing," which told him nothing, and other similarly 
vague factors, plaintiff's objection should have been sustained. 
It is apparent that plaintiff's objection was overruled in 
reliance on Mr. Patterson's representation that Dr. Hunter 
had not testified that he had no knowledge of the facts or data 
upon which such an opinion must be based. The Court's ruling 
was in error, and that testimony erroneously before the jury 
should not now be considered. Were the court correct in 
admitting that testimony, there is insufficient probative value 
in that witness' guess to submit the case to a jury. Owings v. 
Industrial Accident Commission, 31 Cal.2d 289, 192 P.2d 1 (1948). 
j y • • - • • ; • • ' • • • • 
This Court may exclude erroneously admitted 
evidence even though Plaintiff has not cross-appealed. 9 
Moore, Federal Practice, \\ 204.11[3] at p. 933 (2d ed. 1975). 
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Under the criteria of defendant's own authority, Hagenbuck v. 
Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Suppl 676 (D.C.N.H. 1972), defendant's 
case fails for want of competent evidence to show that the 
finished feed, much less plaintiff's goods, contained salmonella 
at the time of delivery. 
B.. DEFENDANT INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF'S GOODS 
WERE UNMERCHANTABLE 
Even if this court were to go so far as to hold that 
there was sufficient evidence of contamination in the component 
parts sold by plaintiff to warrant submission of defendant's 
claim to the jury, this court should still sustain the trial 
court's directed verdict on the grounds that there was a total 
failure of proof that the warranty of merchantability was 
breached. 
The elements of merchantability are outlined in 
§ 70A-2-314(2) of the Utah Code: 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least 
such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under 
the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of 
fair average quality within the descrip-
tion; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for 
which such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by 
the agreement, of even kind, quality and 
quantity within each unit and among 
all units involved; and 
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(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and 
labeled as the agreement may require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirma-
tions of fact made on the container 
or label if any. 
A similar lack of evidence of unmerchantability 
was recently before the Idaho Supreme Court, in Consolidated 
Supply Company v. Babbit, 96 Idaho 636, 534, P.2d 466 (1975). 
There, the court focused its attention on the merchantability 
of a floor drain grating manufactured for use in swimming pools. 
Although some allegations of defects in the drain were made, the 
record disclosed no evidence that such defects caused the drain 
to be unmerchantable. In finding a lack of evidence of breach, 
the court said, "where the dispute concerns an alleged breach 
of implied warranty, the burden is on the buyer to prove that 
the breach did in fact occur. Goods to be merchantable, must 
be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are to 
be used.11 (emphasis added) There, as here, where no evidence 
is presented to show a material deviation from the ordinary, 
the proponent has not met his burden of proof and cannot 
recover. The defendant cannot rest upon a showing that plaintiff's 
goods may have been less than perfect, defendant's burden is to 
present evidence that the goods were unmerchantable, as defined 
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__2/ 
by the statute. 
Even if the defendant had met its burden and presented 
evidence to establish the presence of moderate salmonella in 
plaintiff's goods, no evidence appears in the record to prove that 
the presence of salmonella rendered the goods unmerchantable. 
First, there is no evidence that the goods would not 
have passed without objection in the trade. The only evidence 
in the record was that Mr. Haderlie subscribed to higher 
standards than other hog farmers in the area and would have 
refused feed that the others would have accepted. 
Q. (Mr. Van Wagoner) Mr. Haderlie, I 
gathered from the testimony yesterday that you 
take your hog farming seriously? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that you have higher standards 
than other hog farmers in the area? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is that possible that you would refuse 
feed that other hog farmers might take? 
A. It's possible. 
Q. In fact it may be very likely, isn't it? 
A. Yes. (Tr. 109-110) 
_2/ 
Similarly, in Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 
198 N.E.2d 309 (Mass. 1964), a purchaser of fish chowder brouglrt 
an action to recover for breach of the implied warranty of merchan-
tability because the chowder contained some fish bones. There, 
the court held that there was no evidence to show that the presence 
of fish bones rendered the chowder unmerchantable and dismissed 
the buyer's action. 
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That evidence and all its reasonable inferences certainly do not 
tend to show that plaintiff!s goods were objectionable in the 
trade. 
Secondly, there is a complete absence of testimony 
that these goods were not of fair average quality. Additionally, 
no evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the 
goods were not fit for the ordinary purposes for which the goods 
are used, to wit, to feed ordinary hogs. The sole testimony in 
this regard is offered by defendant's veterinarian, Dr. Hunter. 
Testifying in response to a question from plaintiff's counsel 
on cross-examination, Dr. Hunter gave his opinion of the signifi-
cance of feeding the allegedly defective grain to other hogs 
without incident. 
A. O.K. There are at least two possibilities, 
as I see them. One is, I think you answered your 
own question, the lack of reported outbreak of 
salmonella alone. And it is highly possible that 
the other hog farmers did not report any salmonella. 
I mean report any diarrhea. The other possibility, 
and the one I personally feel more feasible, and 
that is that Egbert-Haderlie!s Hog Farm, it borders 
on an S.P.F., Specific Pathogen Free hog farm, 
which means that every measure is taken that is 
possible to take to avoid any contamination, outside 
contaminants, avoid any possibility of people 
visiting, and possibility of any contaminants. 
Most other hog farms, at least in Utah County, 
are not of this nature. And therefore the contaminant, 
or the salmonella that was in the feed when taken to 
other hog farms, the other hogs could be more host 
specific and they could be more — have a higher 
resistance to the salmonella than did Mr. Haderlie's 
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hogs. And therefore wouldn't show any diarrhea. 
It depends on the population, the amount of immunity 
in the population. An example I often use is when 
you catch cold, how come everybody doesn't catch a 
cold. Only maybe certain members of each family 
will. And it just depends on the host susceptibility. 
And on a farm like this, a closed situation 
like this, the individuals are highly susceptible 
whereas in another instance the susceptibility and 
the immunity may be very, very high and you won't 
get any diarrhea. 
(Tr. 192-193) 
Dr. Hunter further described defendant's hogs on cross-examination. 
Q. (Mr. Van Wagoner) Is this a common thing 
among hogs? 
A. Common thing among any living organism, 
among most hogs it's common. Then you could have 
some minor amounts of salmonella and it wouldn't 
show up, wouldn't harm them at all. Yes, this 
could be possible. 
Q. Mr. Haderlie's hogs are really sort of 
unique, then, aren't they? 
A. They are. Well, I wouldn't call it unique. 
He just tries to run a clean operation. 
Q. But in the sense they may be more susceptible 
to disease than ordinary hogs, they are unique? 
A. In that respect, yes. 
(Tr. 194) 
Not only is there a complete lack of evidence that the plaintiff's 
goods were not fit for ordinary purposes, the only evidence in 
the record demonstrates that moderate amounts of salmonella are 
common and would not have harmed ordinary hogs. Moreover, there 
is clear evidence that the defendant's pigs were more susceptible 
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to moderate salmonella than ordinary hogs but not a scintilla 
of evidence that plaintiff's goods were unfit for ordinary hogs* 
Consequently, defendant's evidence reflects only upon an extra-
ordinary use of the feed and is not probative of the feed's 
fitness "for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are 
used." Utah Code § 70-2-314 (a) (c)* 
Finally, defendant advanced no evidence to suggest 
that the goods did not run of even kind, quality and quantity; 
or that the goods were not adequately contained, packaged and 
labeled; or that there were promises or affirmations of fact 
on any container or label to- which the goods did not conform. 
In fact, there was nothing to present to the jury. 
There was no evidence that the much-discussed, moderate amount 
of salmonella detected by Dr. Derrick (Tr. 137) originated 
in plaintiff's goods. And even if such evidence had been adduced 
there was no evidence that such feed was unfit for ordinary 
hogs and thus, unmerchantable• Absent such evidence, defendant 
cannot recover. Defendant has adduced no evidence that 
plaintiff's grains were unmerchantable• Moreover, the defendant 
brought forth no evidence that the entire mixture, including the 
defendant's own component, was unmerchantable. Those were 
fatal failings from which defendant's case cannot recover. 
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Defendant's contention of breach of implied warranty of merchan-
tability is without merit. First, defendant presented no evidence 
that the transaction was predominantly for the sale of goods. 
Secondly, even were the transaction characterized as a sale of 
goods, defendant advanced no evidence that salmonella was in 
plaintiff's goods at any time prior to delivery. Finally, even 
if defendant had adduced evidence sufficient to show the existence 
of moderate salmonella in plaintiff's goods, the record discloses 
no evidence that such salmonella made the coeds unmerchantable. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE 
EXISTENCE OF AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE 
In some commercial transactions where, as here, a 
party has special needs, those needs are communicated to a 
seller, and the seller is aware of a prospective buyer's reliance 
on the seller's expertise, the Code implies an additional 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose: 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has 
reason to know any particular purpose for which the 
goods are required and that the buyer is relying 
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or 
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded 
or modified under the next section an implied 
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such 
purpose. §70A-2-315, U.C.A. 
As the Code directs this warranty is to be implied only where 
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(a) At the time of contracting; 
(b) The seller has reason to know that the goods he 
sells are required for a particular purpose; and 
(c) The seller has reason to know that the buyer is 
relying on the seller's judgment to select or 
furnish goods suitable for that purpose. 
Although the defendant does not advance this warranty on appeal, 
a brief analysis of the warranty will highlight the defendant's 
unique position in that (1) the defendant supplied part of the 
mixture, (2) specified the mixture formula, and (3) had special 
pigs. 
A contract of sale under the Code may include both 
a warranty of merchantability and a warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose, but they are distinct warranties, the former 
a warranty of average quality for ordinary purposes, the latter 
a warranty of specific quality for particular purposes. In the 
instant case the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose appear 
well suited for defendant's circumstances. Defendant owns uniquely 
susceptible hogs which may become violently ill by contact with 
ordinary pathogens. Nevertheless, it is obvious that even had 
defendant advanced this theory.on appeal it would not prevail. 
Principally, there is no evidence in the record to 
show that the plaintiff was aware of the extraordinary sensitivity 
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of defendant's hogs. That alone would bar submission of this 
case to the jury on that theory. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that defendant relied on the plaintiff in any way. The record 
is clear that defendant obtained a standard formula from Standard 
Chemical Company and submitted it to plaintiff. 
Q. (Mr. Patterson) O.K. Let's do it that way. 
During calendar year 1973, and prior to July 1973, 
was there a particular type of feed that you were 
utilizing? 
A. (Mr. Haderlie) Yes. We had formulas set 
up for us, worked with the feed company and had 
balanced formulas. 
Q. Now, the formulas, you said you had them 
set up for you. Was someone else working with you 
in establishing what sort of dietary basis these 
formulas would be? 
A. Yes. Standard Chemical. 
Q. And where are these people located? 
A. Omaha, Nebraska. 
•\ 
Q. And then whatfs the . . . Then once this 
standard formula was worked out, then what happened? 
What did you do with it? 
A. We took the formula to Bunker Feed, or Gro-
Best, what they was known as at that time, and we 
sat down with them and we presented the formula to 
them and asked them to price it for us and make 
this particular feed for us. 
(Tr. 15-16) 
The comments to the Uniform Commerical Code are explicit that no 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises under such 
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circumstances. Official Comment 2, to §2-315 explains that a 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose does not arise 
when a buyer takes upon himself the responsibility of furnishing 
technical specifications. Similarly Comment 9, to §2-316 explains 
The situation in which the buyer gives 
precise and complete specifications to the 
seller is not explicitly covered in this 
section, but this is a frequent circumstance 
by which the implied warranties may be excluded. 
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 
would not normally arise since in such a 
situation there is usually no reliance on the 
seller by the buyer . . . 
Thus without specific evidence of reliance this warranty would 
not arise, and it would not be error to refuse to submit the case 
to a jury. Without sufficient evidence to establish both the 
plaintiff's knowledge of the defendants peculiar needs and the 
defendant's reliance on the plaintiff's skill, the law ' 
implies no warranty for a particular purpose. Aluminum Company of 
America v. Electro Flo Corp,, 451 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1971); 
Wasatch Chemical Co. v. Leon, 123 U.2d 296, 259 P.2d 301 (1953). 
In this case there was no evidence from which the jury could 
reasonably have found the existence of such a warranty. The trial 
court was correct in directing a verdict against the defendant's 
allegations of breach of this implied warranty* 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case, offers several grounds, 
any one of which is sufficient to sustain the direction of 
the verdict against defendant. First, no evidence was pre-
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sented which could in any way demonstrate that the transaction 
was primarily for the sale of goods rather than the rendition *• 
of services and, therefore, no warranties either express or 
implied could arise under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
Even if this initial insufficiency in defendant's 
case is overlooked and a sale of goods giving rise to warranties 
under the Uniform Commercial Code is assumed, defendant intro-
duced no evidence to establish either a breach of an express 
warranty of conformity or an implied warranty of merchantability. 
There was no evidence of breach of an express warranty 
of conformity to the mixing order causing damage to defendant. 
That warranty, if assumed, goes only to the components to be 
mixed and the only possible evidence of breach is the testimony 
of Mr. Haderlie that the feed was "off color". This evidence 
was in no way tied to salmonella or defendant's damages. Even 
assuming that "off color" appearance implied salmonella, defen-
dant would be barred because he himself noted the color and 
then fed his hogs with it, thus assuming the risk as a matter 
of law. 
There was no evidence of breach of an implied warranty 
of merchantability, assuming one arose, since defendant intro-
duced no evidence that any of the grains plaintiff sold contained 
salmonella at the time of delivery. Plaintiff did not warrant 
the Mr. Meaty Base Mix which defendant itself supplied since one 
cannot warrant what it does not sell. Even were the court 
to assume that plaintifffs grain contained salmonella at the 
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time of delivery, there was no evidence that the feed was not 
merchantable. The only evidence in the record is that the 
feed would not have harmed ordinary hogs and would have passed 
without objection in the trade. The record shows that defen-
dant's hogs were special hogs which were extremely susceptible 
to pathogens* Under the Uniform Commercial Code, an implied 
warranty of merchantability is breached only if the goods are 
unfit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used 
and that they would not pass without objection in the trade. 
The trial court's direction of the verdict against 
defendant is amply supported by the record and should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of February, 1976. 
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